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I. INTRODUCTION 
The development of genetic technologies, nano-technologies and 
technologies related to artificial intelligence have provoked 
discussion about the different uses to which they may be put; namely, 
their potential for therapeutic and non-therapeutic use. Resisting 
claims that individuals should be free to use these technologies as 
they see fit to alter their own physical, psychological and intellectual 
capacities, lifespan and morphologies or those of their existing or 
future children, some authors contend that both ethical and 
regulatory limits should be placed on this exercise of free choice.1 
A number of academics have suggested that the 
therapy/enhancement distinction can perform both moral and 
regulatory work in assisting us with resolving the tricky issue of 
which uses of these technologies to permit and which to discourage or 
ban.2 In this article, we examine how therapy and enhancement are 
characteristically understood in ethical, medical and legal contexts, and 
how these understandings rely on unstated assumptions about the 
meanings attributed to different forms of embodiment: normal and 
 disabled, healthy and diseased, able-bodied and impaired, and 
beautiful and functional. We argue, consistent with feminist and 
disability studies critiques, that the idea of a ‘normal’ body as a 
benchmark against which other bodies are judged is unsustainable 
despite observing that ‘the closer corporeality approximates to a 
socio-culturally variant position of normativity the more acceptable 
it becomes’.3 We track the way in which bodies (within medico-legal 
and biotechnological discourses) are regulated and managed in 
relation to shifting normative ideals. This exploration leads us to 
conclude that the therapy/enhancement distinction is inadequate and 
unhelpful to guide ethical analysis and medical and regulatory 
decision making, and cannot adequately assist us in adjudicating 
when it is appropriate to allow individual choice and autonomy to 
govern the use of these technologies and when the State should 
intervene. 
In the first part of this article, we critically examine the meaning of 
enhancement and therapy and draw on feminist and disability studies 
critiques of normalcy to put pressure on the viability of the distinction. 
Conventionally, therapeutic interventions are understood to restore or 
bring an individual’s morphology and capacities within the normal 
range, while enhancements imply going beyond that which is normal. 
The concept of ‘normal’ embodiment is the fulcrum upon which the 
therapy/enhancement distinction rests and from which it derives its 
purchase. Moreover, normatively, the idea of ‘normal’ or ‘normalcy’ 
 sets the standard around which bodies are  evaluated,  regulated  and  
are even permitted to materialise. However, as we argue below, 
what is ‘normal’ is ‘not only being superceded in practice, but has been 
unstable all along’4 and is thus unable to support the 
therapy/enhancement distinction that rests upon it. While exposing the 
fallacy of normalcy, we also come to understand that enhancement is a 
paradox. In  its promise of something better, it renders those of us at 
the base line in a state of inadequacy. 
Next, we focus on the idea of prosthesis as offering restoration and 
also as an ‘add-on’. It is the perfect vehicle for deeper exploration of 
the therapy/enhancement distinction because restoration can never be 
complete if an add-on is always available to make us better. Using 
prosthesis as a model, we suggest that the ‘normal’ body is a theoretical 
construct dependent upon social and historical contexts. 
Finally, using the example of the regulation of preimplantation 
genetic diagnosis (PGD), we demonstrate how laws that prohibit or 
limit the use of PGD for enhancement purposes and facilitate 
therapeutic uses of the technology cannot be characterised nor 
justified on the basis of this distinction. Legal rules based on ideas 
of ‘normal’ embodiment are, in fact, normative, constructing 
both a departure from and congruence with ideas about the 
normal/normative. In so doing, certain types of embodiment are 
elevated as self-evidently desirable while other forms of embodiment, 
what we might call anomalous, deviant or even disabled, are made 
 preemptively undesirable.5 
 
II. THERAPY, ENHANCEMENT AND NORMALCY 
A. What Is Enhancement and What Is Therapy? 
In 2003, the US President’s Council on Bioethics examined the 
therapy/enhancement distinction in its report Beyond Therapy: 
Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Happiness.6 In a description 
offered (but in fact not explicitly relied upon by the Council), we 
are told that therapy understood in the context of the 
therapy/enhancement, distinction, and: 
as in common understanding, is the use of biotechnical power to treat 
individuals with known diseases, disabilities, or impairments in an 
attempt to restore them to a normal state of health and fitness.7 
Enhancement is described as: 
the directed use of biotechnical power to alter, by direct intervention, 
not disease processes but the ‘normal’ workings of the human body 
and psyche, to augment or improve their native capacities and 
performances.8 
The report goes on to state: 
Those who introduced this distinction hoped by this means to 
distinguish between the acceptable and the dubious or 
unacceptable uses of biomedical technology: therapy is always 
ethically fine, enhancement is, at least prima facie, ethically 
 suspect.9 
However, the term enhancement is highly problematic. Does it mean 
‘more’ or ‘better’ and, if ‘better’, by what standards? If ‘enhancement’ 
is defined in opposition to ‘therapy,’ what do ‘healthy’ and ‘impaired’, 
‘diseased’, ‘disabled’, ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ and ‘super-normal’ all 
mean? And what about the meaning of ‘therapy’ or ‘treatment’? Does 
it mean preserving or restoring someone to a standard of  species 
typical normal functioning as is often suggested,10 and if so, can the 
norm be equated with the average? As the President’s Council asks: 
‘[i]s it therapy to give growth hormone to a genetic dwarf, but not to 
a short fellow who is just unhappy to be short?’11 Moreover, does 
treatment include aesthetic modifications and if so to what extent?12 
Must such modification be limited to ‘normalisation’ rather than 
beautification? Does therapy include modification for the purposes of 
adjusting the body to suit the social environment whether or not 
that has the outcome of species typicality? The use of high-tech 
prostheses by double amputees that enable them to run fast is an 
example of this kind of intervention. We will return to this example 
below. 
As Kerry Taylor and Roxanne Mykitiuk have written: 
The ‘normal’ is perceived to be an objective way to think about 
human beings, a means to represent or quantify ‘what is’ on the 
basis of statistical averages. However, the ‘normal’ also contains 
 often opaque and unquestioned value judgments, and is used to 
represent what is right, and desirable. [. . .] ‘Normalcy’ is used 
to rationalize medical attempts to eradicate our differences, and 
to render all bodies alike – healthy and interchangeable – as 
sameness is perceived to be the foundation of equality.13 
The effect of this is to secure the social positioning of the disabled as 
abnormal and deviant rather than simply different.14 Scully and 
Rehmann-Sutter suggest that this exclusion from the normal may also 
result in a classification that places the person ‘outside the category of 
being naturally human’.15 However, as we discuss below, the categories 
‘normal’ and ‘disabled’ are  problematised and confounded when 
having a disability is simultaneously construed as enabling or giving 
effect to a ‘superability’. Parents of children with autism or Williams 
Syndrome, for instance, have argued that their children have both 
extraordinary capacities and incapacities at the same time.16 
The therapy/enhancement distinction is clearly problematic. The 
concept of enhancement pre-supposes too many certainties about the 
so-called normal state beyond which it would or should be wrong to 
journey, while the concept of therapy embraces a standard of health 
and embodiedness that insists that those who do not meet it should 
desire to meet it, and need to meet it. The underlying assumption 
built into the therapy/enhancement distinction, that there are universal 
ideas of acceptable or desirable embodiment that must be interrogated. 
In order to challenge claims about what is and is not normative 
 embodiment for the purposes of legitimating treatment or proscribing 
enhancement, we focus specifically on how understandings of disability 
and anomalous embodiment17 complicate the very basis of the 
distinction. Our aim here is to wrestle with assertions about what 
constitutes a deficiency and what constitutes an improvement. 
 
B. How Does the Therapy/Enhancement Distinction Guide 
Ethical Analysis? 
In his article ‘NBIC, NGO’s and the three types of disabled people’,18 
Gregor Wolbring describes three categories of  disabled  people.  The 
first is the patient type who wishes to be fixed to the norm and sees 
his or her own biological reality as a defect, for whom medical care, 
rehabilitation and technological devices—including assistive or 
prosthetic devices—offer a fix towards or  up to  the norm. The  
second is the transhumanist19 type who ‘sees their own body, as 
well as the ‘normal’ human body as a ‘defect’ in need of not just 
fixing to the norm but in need of augmentations above the norm with 
the addition of new abilities’ facilitated by the use of new 
technologies.20 Finally, there is the social justice type who uses 
technology to change  the physical environment or to change the 
interaction with the physical environment. In this model: 
[d]isability is not seen as an attribute of an individual, but rather a 
complex collection of conditions, many of which are created by the 
 [social] environment. . . and socially mediated aspects of the 
physical environment. . .[This] model of disability does not negate 
that a disabled person has a certain biological reality (like 
having no legs), which makes her/him different in her/his 
abilities, which make her/him not fit the norm. But it views the 
‘need to fit a norm’ as the disability and questions whether 
many deviations from the norm need a medical solution 
(adherence to the norm) or a social solution (change/elimination 
of norm).21 
While Wolbring has separated out those who seek to adjust their 
embodiment in line with technological opportunities from those who 
challenge the need to fit the norm, we suggest that the line between these 
categories is, in fact, fluid. For instance, one might want both prosthetic 
devices and alterations to the social environment. It is quite possible 
that an individual’s desire to use prosthetics has nothing to do with fixing a 
‘defect’ in his or her body and nothing to do with enhancement beyond 
the ‘norm’, but is rather about facilitating another way of being in 
the world. Recent scholarly debates  about prosthetics  are  useful  in 
helping  us better understand the dynamics among the body, disability 
and technology and their relationship to normative evaluations about 
therapy and enhancement. By using the example of prosthesis, we show 
how regulation that is based on the possibility of a complete self 
towards which we might strive and beyond which we should not wish 
 to go, fails to understand the prosthetic  nature  of all embodiment.  
If embodiment is always variable, then we need to come up with 
different ethical and legal justifications for regulating some uses of 
technologies and not others. 
 
III. PROSTHESIS, DISABILITY AND SUPER-ABILITY 
A. Prosthetising the Body 
Disability scholars Mitchell and Snyder state that ‘a body deemed 
lacking, unfunctional, or inappropriately functional needs 
compensation, and prosthesis helps to effect this end’.22 Understood 
in this way, prosthesis is an addition or supplement to the body—
one that aims to restore wholeness to a body that is otherwise 
incomplete and abnormal. Prosthetics replace, or fill in for, something 
that is missing, and in their presence remind us of what is absent 
from that body.23 Through the use of prosthetics, an attempt is made 
to normalise the individual and deviant body so that, to the extent 
possible, it functions and looks like a ‘normal’ body. 
However, Lennard Davis argues  that the conceptualisation of  the 
body as deficient does not necessitate its improvement. Rather, 
according to Davis, there is always and only a ‘partial, incomplete 
subject whose realization is not autonomy and independence but 
dependency and interdependence’.24 Davis suggests that a normal body 
is a theoretical construct and not a material reality. The norm is an 
 idealised quantitative and qualitative measure that is divorced from 
(rather than derived from) the observation of bodies, which are 
inherently variable. Moreover, as Wills contends, ‘the prosthetic body 
will not be an exception but the paradigm for the body itself’25 as we 
all attempt to shape, modify and contort our material flesh and blood 
bodies to fit the theoretical and idealised norm. But, the norm itself is 
not static, nor are the quantitative and qualitative dimensions used to  
establish  the  norm. That which is theoretical, abstract and idealised 
(the norm as opposed to the material body) is a shifting baseline 
around which distinctions about therapy and enhancement in relation to 
material bodies are made. As none of us has a normative body (one that 
corresponds to a ‘universalised template of how corporeality should 
appear’),26 it is necessary to critique the standard of normalcy situating 
it within a shifting social and historical context where the meanings of 
bodies both in their material and conceptual form are constantly 
refigured. As Margrit Shildrick suggests: 
[t]he claim that there might be a body, any body, that is not 
modified is surely implausible. Bodies are not static givens, nor do 
they settle, but rather emerge in both continuous and 
discontinuous process.27 
Nevertheless, she agrees that there is the ‘force of socio-cultural and 
psychic investments in promoting a universalised template of how 
corporeality should appear’.28 
 The idea of the prosthetic is particularly useful here if we consider it 
not only in its conventional sense of replacing or restoring that which is 
missing, but as a means to facilitate ways of being that can be more or 
less in accordance with social norms and conventions. Returning to 
Wolbring’s typology of the relationship between disabled persons and 
technology, in our view, both the patient and transhumanist types 
illustrate the contradictions and contingencies of the regime of 
normalcy as individuals seek to modify themselves with and through 
technology in line with a base line that is itself constantly shifting over 
time as individuals continuously strive to achieve or surpass it. While 
Wolbring seems to suggest that only uses of technology that alter the 
physical environment and not the person can offer an antidote to the 
oppressive practices of normalising (and enhancing), we question 
whether (all) uses of prosthetic technology must be viewed as 
enforcing normalcy. Rather, consistent with the social model of 
disability, a critique of the therapy/ enhancement distinction would 
suggest that not all uses of prosthetics are aimed at modelling the body 
in accordance with the norm or normative body. If the appropriate 
response to disability resides in altering the environment writ large, 
and eliminating oppression on the basis of difference, then a 
technological/prosthetic alteration of the body, in a social context 
where such environmental alterations are also made, need not 
constitute therapy or enhancement. 
Davis observes ‘what is universal in life if there are universals, is the 
 experience of the limitations of the body’.29  We are all incomplete 
and disabled, requiring technological  alterations  and  interventions  to 
our environments and ourselves, and involvement by way of social 
policies and regulations to enable us. Unlike the transhumanist dystopia 
imagined by Wolbring, whereby the incomplete body is always regarded 
as negative and in need of improvement, Davis’ incomplete subject is the 
ideal subject and the complete subject an unattainable fantasy that does 
harm to our sense of self. That being the case, prosthesis becomes one of 
a panoply of options that facilitates being in a  body  and  being  in  a 
world,  along  with  social  and  legal  interventions  which   determine 
where value lies  and  the  conditions  within  which  what  is  valued  can 
be distributed. Using the example  of  prosthesis  both  in  its  material 
and metaphorical sense, we suggest that what is problematic is not the 
possibility of bodily modification, but the policing through regulatory 
regimes of  a  normative  embodiment  that  reflects  some  kind  of 
average human functioning or that accords with specific  oppressive 
ideals about appropriate aesthetic and physical manifestations and 
expressions. 
Wolbring describes, by way of example, several ways to think of a 
person without legs rather than as disabled: 
 
Let’s take a look at a – so called – ‘disabled person’ without legs. 
If he/she sees him/herself as a defect in need of legs he/she sees 
him/herself as a – so called – medical problem in need of fixing. 
 Furthermore if he/she sees the concept of legs as they are as 
outdated and deficient and therefore tries to add on mobility 
devices to their body which makes him/her much more capable 
in his/her mobility than mere biological legs could provide with 
that self-understanding this person will of course support everyone 
and everything offering him/her this augmentation. However 
what if that person sees themselves as just fine in his/her 
biological reality and their different mode of movement? What if  
that  person wants to have a societal cure meaning the fixing of 
society meaning that society starts to support their way of 
movement (wheelchair, crawling. . .)?30 
Wolbring’s rereading of physical anomaly as something other than 
disability requires a further rethinking of not just disability but 
enhancement too. In Wolbring’s account of the ways to think about 
a person without legs, he includes the transhumanist model that he has 
outlined earlier. It is worth considering Wolbring’s decision to use the 
language of “transhumanism” in his analysis since we would argue 
that the kind of transhumanists to whom he refers wrongly presuppose 
a stable state of the human and human embodiment that have come 
before.31 The perception that one’s limbs are outdated and deficient 
because they are ‘mere biological legs’ suggests that the starting point 
for an analysis of treatment versus enhancement is constantly shifting 
and depends very much on the way in which the body is 
 constructed. Contemporary enhancement technologies, in the 
transhumanist model, are described as allowing us to be more than, 
or beyond, human.32 However, if we view the human state as 
always incomplete then technologies that might be attached to 
the human can be understood as part of a panoply of social 
goods and ills that we might have access to and that need to be 
distributed justly or not at all. This is not to suggest that technological 
alterations to the body should be preferred over those made to the 
geographical and social environments, but that we must not concede the 
meaning of such bodily alterations to those sympathetic to 
transhumanist ideology. 
 
B. Proselytising Prosthetics? 
Histories of disability reveal the way in which attitudes towards people 
with, and the meanings ascribed to, anomalous bodies are contingent on 
broader cultural, economic and social factors. When we are forced to 
confront the positive alignment of anomalous embodiment with 
achievement and when this is done not by rendering the anomalies 
invisible but rather by emphasising their existence, the undesirability 
of that difference is profoundly challenged. It is not simply that this 
results in a sympathetic response to anomalous embodiment but more 
radically that it subverts the account of anomalies as disabling. 
Indeed, in some instances, disability has been recast as enhancement. 
This is not to question the very material and real consequences of 
 living with a disability in a world that is not organised around that 
bodily difference, but to question the notion that in supplementing the 
aberrant body, the aim of prosthetics qua prosthetics is to keep the 
individual within the ‘normal’ range. 
Rosemarie Garland-Thomson scrutinises ‘the intersections between 
the  politics  of  appearance  and  the  medicalisation  of  subjugated 
bodies’33 in order to unpack the categories of disability and normalcy. 
She provides a schema of disability with four aspects: 
 
[f]irst, it is a system for interpreting and disciplining bodily 
variations; second, it is a relationship between bodies and their 
environments; third it is a set of practices that produce both the 
able-bodied and the disabled; fourth it is a way of describing 
the inherent instability of the embodied self.34 
Each of these form part of a system in which the ‘fantasy of the body 
as a neutral, compliant instrument of some transcendent will’35 is 
radically challenged. Returning to the problematic of the prosthesis, 
it is Garland-Thomson’s account of the work of fashion model, elite 
athlete and double-amputee Aimee Mullins that is most illustrative for 
our purposes. Garland-Thomson argues that the juxtaposition of 
Mullins’s disabled body with the discourse of fashion represents an 
irruptive moment where ‘as legless and beautiful she is an embodied 
paradox asserting an inherently disruptive potential’.36 Born without 
fibulae, Mullins’ parents made the decision to have her legs amputated 
 below the knee when she was a baby and by doing so, to enable mobility 
through prosthetic limbs. Mullins uses a variety of prosthetic legs 
depending on the context. For instance, for fashion shoots she wears 
legs like those of a Barbie doll, not only long and slender, but fixed in 
a position to wear high heels. As an elite runner and when competing 
in races, Mullins wears titanium legs that are specially designed for 
this purpose. These legs, based on cheetah legs, bear little resemblance 
to natural human legs. As Garland-Thomson argues, the 
spectacularisation of disability in such contexts subverts normative 
responses to disability as disabling. This is not to suggest that 
corporeal variation is fabricated, but rather that the meaning of that 
variation is contingent upon culturally produced systems of 
understanding of the self. 
Garland-Thomson describes the case of disabled fashion modelling as 
an activist cultural practice that is potentially transformative because the 
body on display is marked by a highly visible disability. Taking the first 
of Garland-Thomson’s four aspects of disability, rather than 
disciplining bodily variations in this instance, disability invokes an 
inherently disruptive potential that enables disability to be read as  
fashion. Aimee Mullins has posed in her running legs and her 
cosmetic legs for fashion houses such as Gucci and fashion 
magazines such as Dazed and Confused. While Garland-Thomson 
is impressed by Mullins’s refusal to cover up or smooth over the 
joints where her artificial legs meet her flesh, and cites their 
 appearance as a  disruptive  moment, there is, of course, a sense in 
which what is being referenced is the already existing and sexist 
requirement that women live up to ideals of beauty that are only 
realisable in plastic. Indeed, the reference to the doll or the  
mannequin  is  quite  deliberate.  This then  draws  out the second 
aspect of Garland-Thomson’s schema, the relationship between 
bodies and their environments. Mullins operates within the 
discourse of contemporary values and social oppressions. Marquard 
Smith argues, for instance, that Mullins is ‘sexualized as an able-bodied 
woman who just happens to be an amputee’.37 He goes on: ‘[a]t best her 
status as an amputee must be acknowledged and disavowed 
simultaneously’.38 While these discourses of sexist objectification do 
permeate the Mullins photo shoot, at the same time the 
representation of disability as undesirable or needing repair is 
challenged. Mullins’s more recent appearance in glass legs for the 
final  episode  of  the movie Cremaster by Matthew Barney is a further 
play with the idea of prosthesis. These legs simultaneously fill the gap 
where her ‘real’ legs would be (making her whole) while in their 
transparency, exposing that very absence.39 
In an advertisement for a UK internet company ‘Freeserve’ featuring 
Aimee Mullins as a fashion model on the catwalk, the relationship 
between normalcy, disability, bodily modification and enhancement is 
further interrogated in the  narrative  frame  of  an  able-bodied  young 
girl (approximately 8 years old). The  advertisement  begins  with  the 
 little girl on the catwalk asking: ‘What do I like about Aimee? Let’s 
see. She likes to run, like me. There is a lot of things that we have in 
common’. These words are interspersed with images of  behind  the 
scene preparations for the fashion show that include  a  parade  of 
weird and fantastical characters. Aimee Mullins parades down the 
catwalk in runners, her cosmetic  legs  and  finally  her  athletic  legs. 
The advertisement ends with the little girl and Aimee sitting  on  the 
catwalk after the show  in conversation.  The  girl  turns to  Mullins  and 
says ‘I mean you’re free to be who you want to be’ to which Aimee 
nods.  The  final  shot  of  the  advertisement—first  a  view  of  Mullins 
from the waist down sitting in a chair, wearing her cheetah legs, then a 
shot of her face has Aimee saying ‘it’s a total feeling of accomplishment’ 
before fading to black and projecting the company’s name. Through this 
advertisement we see a complete inversion of normalcy and 
accomplishment. It starts with the little girl insisting on her 
commonality with Aimee and ends by insisting on difference as a state 
of accomplishment and freedom. The shocking suggestion that this 
able-bodied girl might indeed want to be Aimee Mullins, 
amputations and all, is inevitable and in this way our notions of what 
it is to be disabled and what it is to be enhanced are thrown into 
radical doubt. Indeed, the advertisement reverses the typical liberal 
humanist response of pity and worthy regard and borrows, instead, 
from discourses of triumphalism and heroism; because it neither fully 
occupies either discourse, it troubles  both. While much of the 
 material experience of embodiment by both the so-called abled and 
disabled is of the order of the everyday; going to the shops, doing a 
job, hanging out with friends and does not involve being a super 
model or running in the Olympics, the power of these subversive 
representational discourses and their mainstream validation by 
consumer capital cannot be underestimated. They force recognition of 
a spectrum of difference and variation rather than a binary between 
abled and disabled which is key to our challenge to the enhancement/ 
therapy distinction. Vivian Sobchack has described her experience of 
having a prosthetic leg in just these terms. She says: 
Here with Aimee Mullins’s legs (both onscreen and off), we have 
both – and simultaneously – incorporation and projection, an 
overcoming and a resistance, an unstoppable ‘difference’ that is 
not about negation but about the alterity of becoming. . ..As for 
me, despite my awe and admiration for Mullins. . .I  have  no 
desire to keep pace with her. . .all [I want is] to be able to walk to 
work, to the store and maybe on a treadmill at the gym. . .  so 
I can get about my world with the minimum of prosthetic 
thought.40 
What then is the ‘normal’ body from which all enhancements and 
therapies are to be benchmarked? Garland-Thomson argues that the 
so-called ‘natural’ body—that which is unmodified by medical 
intervention in this modern day consumerist universe—is no longer the 
 normal body but rather the modified body is portrayed as normal in 
its most ideal state. Referring to cosmetic surgery, she says: 
The beautiful woman of the twenty-first century is sculpted from 
top to bottom, generically neutral, all irregularities regularised, 
all particularities expunged. She is thus nondisabled, deracialised 
and de-ethnicised.41 
We need to be careful here, however, to distinguish beauty from 
normalcy. The beautiful woman to whom Garland-Thomson refers is 
one who has been regularised or normalised. Standards of beauty as 
ideal, however, are typically not regular nor normal. Supermodels 
such as Kate Moss, Sophie Dahl, Gemma Ward and Agyness Deyn, 
to name a few, are not ordinary or regular by any stretch of the 
imagination. Gemma Ward, for instance, has been described as alien in 
appearance.42 Normative embodiment, created through cosmetic body 
modification practices, takes the place of ‘natural’ embodiment by 
allowing more people to access the same point on the bell curve.43 
This demonstrates Garland-Thomson’s third (and perhaps most 
important for our purposes) aspect of disability, i.e. it is social 
practices that construct abled and disabled embodiment. These social 
practices also construct ideas of super-ability and enhancement. 
Sports enhancement is a potent example of how the desire to alter 
human biology is inextricably tied to existing social structures. 
Arguably, athletic excellence only takes on meaning in a field with 
 definite rules and measurable standards.44 Oscar Pistorius, a double-
amputee sprinter, demonstrates this argument. Pistorius argued 
recently before the International Olympic Committee that he should 
be eligible to compete in the able-bodied Olympics using his 
prosthetic limbs. Initially, Pistorius’s request was denied. It was 
argued that his prosthetic limbs would give him an unfair 
advantage over runners competing with non-prosthetic legs. Rather 
than bring him up to the norm, it was suggested that Pistorius’s 
prosthetic legs would enhance his capacity to run. The prosthetic legs, it 
is argued, make him taller and give him a longer stride than he would 
have had with his natural legs, thereby giving him an unfair advantage 
when using them to compete against those without such prosthetics. As 
Jere´ Longman of the New York Times described: 
 
Pistorius wants to be the first amputee runner to compete in the 
Olympics. But despite his ascendance, he is facing resistance from 
track and field’s world governing body, which is seeking to bar him 
on the grounds that the technology of his prosthetics may give him an 
unfair advantage over sprinters using their natural legs.45 
 
In 2007, the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) 
prohibited the use of ‘any  technical device that incorporates springs, 
wheels or any other element that provides a user with an advantage 
over another athlete not using such a device’.46  It was thought that this 
 would exclude runners such as Pistorius from competing with the so-
called able-bodied athletes.47 In May 2008, however, the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport ruled that there was insufficient evidence to prove 
that Pistorius’ flexible prosthetic legs gave him an advantage.48 But the 
issue is not just one of advantage but of an ‘unfair’ advantage. Critiques 
of enhancement aids in the context of athletic performance typically rely 
upon two claims: first, that achievement has not been earned and 
secondly, that the use of aids is unfair because not all athletes have 
equal access to them.49 But, can these arguments be sustained in the 
case of Oscar Pistorius? Is the benefit he gets from his prosthetic legs an 
unearned advantage? The argument about equal access to prosthetic legs 
is alarming in its implications—that other runners should remove their 
‘natural’ legs and don prosthetic legs like his in order to compete 
with him. But, short of this, what can Pistorius do? While other sprinters 
can experiment with high-tech shoes, and wear friction-free fibre, utilise 
computer-aided training techniques, imbibe nutritional supplements, and 
work out highly technical chemically balanced diets, it seems highly 
questionable to position the fault line between the acceptable and the 
unacceptable at Oscar’s legs. Here, we see the concept of 
enhancement failing to adequately manage the complex relation 
between the contemporary highly technologised and always already 
modified but so-called ‘natural’ body and the enhanced/modified so-
called disabled body.50 
Garland-Thomson’s fourth aspect of disability, the instability of the 
 embodied self, has been dealt with extensively earlier. However, in 
relation to Mullins, it is worth considering her capacity to actually 
transform herself from fashion model to champion runner. It is 
important to remember at this point that questioning the constitution of 
the category normal does not just involve including within it those 
of us who are deficient, it also requires attention to categories of 
excess or excellence. Lennard Davis suggests that the disabled are 
deviants because they represent an extreme end of the curve. 
However, he does not go on to address  the possibility that those 
identified as disabled might simultaneously occupy both ends of the 
curve at once. Aimee Mullins does this in that she is both disabled 
and a super-model, an amputee and a champion sprinter. 
In the context of disability, technologies that add to or modify the 
body recast the idea of enhancement as enabling transgressive and 
subversive embodied possibilities rather than simply pushing 
normativist ableist ideology. 
In Aimee Mullins’s case, it is unlikely on the basis of her enhanced 
disability (note it is not enhanced normativity) that it would be 
accepted that the little girl in the ad should have her legs removed and 
replaced with prostheses. The problem is that for the superabled 
disabled person, they still have no foothold in normativity. Rather 
they go from disability to super-ability without ever stopping at 
normal and therefore without being able to lay claim to that status. 
It is worth recalling Scully and Rehmann-Sutter’s analysis of disabled 
 embodiment as leading to an exclusion from the category of the 
‘naturally human’.51 Here, however, the individual is simultaneously 
‘disabled’ and enabled.52 Surprisingly, this does not seem to 
neutralise the categorisation of the individual as  disabled  but  rather  
leads  to their reclassification as unnaturally human and still therefore 
excluded from the normative humanity. 
Wolbring argues that uses of enhancement technologies aimed at 
disability are in fact concerned with selecting for ability. The 
consequences of an ‘ability selection or disability de-selection 
sentiment’ in his view are that it will undermine a ‘social justice view of 
disability.’ He goes on: 
 
And it will become the morally responsible way of acting. Where 
does the reality of this debate leave disabled people? Stuck with 
the medical/transhumanist model of disability. Where does it 
leave society? In an ability rat race. Ability to perform better. 
Ability to make more money. Ability to win commercial 
competitions. . .53 
However, ability built on disability may not necessarily result in an 
upwards ‘normative creep’ as Wolbring suggests. He says if we take 
the  transhumanist  disability  model: 
the ‘disabled’ (mM) of today will set the new  norm  (normative 
creep) after they were ‘fixed’  above  the  old  norm  (becoming  the 
 new ‘non-disabled’ (sM)) and the ‘non-disabled’ (sM) of today 
will be seen as the new ‘disabled’ (mM).54 
This may be, paradoxically, a far too utopian vision. If the effect of 
enhancement technologies is to rewrite the content of the normative 
categories, then the concern shifts away from the technologies 
themselves to the hierarchisation of the abled individuals to whom the 
technologies are applied. Indeed, it is clear that the norm as a form 
of average or ‘species typical functioning’ continues to persist. The flaw 
in Wolbring’s account is that individuals can only occupy one status or 
position in his typology at any one time whereas, in fact, to be both 
disabled and enhanced or ‘superabled’ at the same time seems to leave 
the normative untouched. 
What we have been trying to do so far is challenge the standard upon 
which the idea of enhancement is meant to make sense. Disability, we 
have shown, is never just that. So, we come back to the question of 
enhancement but this time understood as containing within it 
everything we otherwise considered to be merely ‘treatment or 
therapy’. 
 
IV. THE THERAPY/ENHANCEMENT DISTINCTION AS 
A GUIDE TO REGULATORY DECISION-MAKING 
The aim of this discussion so far has been to examine the sustainability 
and efficacy, as a basis for ethical and medical decision-making, of a 
distinction between those alterations to humans that might be 
 characterised as therapeutic and those that might be characterised as 
enhancement. In this part of the article, we turn our attention to the 
usefulness of this distinction for guiding legal limits. We focus on 
laws that regulate the use and availability of PGD. Legal regimes utilise 
the concept ‘serious disability’ as a benchmark for permissible 
embryo testing using PGD. In most of the legislative instruments 
regulating the use of PGD, ‘serious disability’ is not defined. 
Overall, while it may appear that the therapy/enhancement distinction 
has guided legal determinations about what to allow and what not 
to allow, a closer look at the legislation of three jurisdictions 
suggests both that it does not in fact do so and should not do so. 
Regulations in Australia, Canada and the UK regarding the use and 
availability of PGD are currently undergoing intense scrutiny and 
development. PGD  is  used  to  detect  embryos  with  genetic  anomalies  
and to avoid their development. Typically, only those  embryos that do 
not test positively for the specific genetic anomaly being investigated are 
considered suitable and selected for implantation in the woman’s 
uterus. Were the legislation to be relaxed and should the technology 
become refined it might be  possible  in  the  future  to  select  embryos 
that tested positive for traits such as intelligence and athletic ability. 
Positioned outside of this continuum is what Karpin has coined 
‘negative enhancement’55 where a parent selects in favour of a trait 
commonly associated with a disability. In the context of in vitro 
fertilisation and assisted reproduction, as well as through the use of 
 PGD, some individuals have sought to create  and/or  select  embryos  
with  certain  traits that the majority  of  the  community  might  consider  
undesirable  such as deafness or dwarfism.56 This suggests that at some 
future time if it is possible legally and medically that selections may 
be made not only to achieve traits that the majority of the community 
perceives  to  be normal or better than normal but also to achieve traits a 
niche group perceives as desirable and ‘normal’ for them, though  not  
typical. What then is the role of law and how should  we  determine 
where  to draw the  legal  lines?57 
Canada has not yet promulgated regulations with respect to PGD. 
Canada’s Assisted Human Reproduction (AHR) Act prohibits a 
number of practices while establishing a regulatory framework for 
those reproductive practices that are permissible pursuant to license. 
With respect to the regulation of PGD, the AHR Act prohibits sex 
selection except to prevent, treat or diagnose a sex-linked disease or 
disorder (section 5(e)). In addition, PGD will be governed by the 
AHR Act pursuant to those sections of the legislation and forthcoming 
regulations that deal with the collection, alteration, manipulation or 
treatment of any human reproductive material for the purpose of 
creating an embryo (sections 10(1) and 10(2)). 
While PGD is being carried out in a limited way, and in a regulatory 
vacuum,  in  Canada,  two  publications  of  the  Government  of  Canada 
have identified some of the policy debates raised by this issue. The first 
is a consultation document of the Health Canada Assisted Reproduction 
 Office, Issues Related to the Regulation of Pre-Implantation Genetic 
Diagnosis  Under  the  Assisted  Human  Reproduction  Act58   and  the 
second  is  a  publication  of  the  Canadian  Biotechnology  Secretariat, 
Brave New World: Where Biotechnology and Human Rights Intersect.59 
In  its  consultation  document,  Health  Canada  distinguishes  between 
the use of PGD for ‘medical/health reasons’ and its use for ‘non-health 
related traits such as hair or eye colour’.60  They cite the ‘serious 
condition’ standard as a limitation on the use of PGD about which 
there is  some  agreement,  but  acknowledge  that  it  would  be  
‘difficult  to define’  and  that  ‘there  are  many  complex  factors  
that  need  to  be accounted for in this definition’.61  Moreover, as the 
Brave New World report points out, access to PGD in Canada ‘is 
currently controlled by the medical profession’.62  Falling outside of 
formal regulation, decisions relating to PGD are privately made by the 
woman, or couple, with her doctor.63   Since  there  are  no  regulations  
or  guidelines  about  what  a ‘serious’ condition is, this determination 
falls to the clinicians involved. In  Australia,  therapeutic  selection  
against  serious  disorders  is  not only  allowed  but  facilitated  by  
regulations  and  guidelines  that  allow the use of PGD to screen to 
avoid transmission of these conditions. At the federal level, the National 
Health and Medical Research Council’s Ethical Guidelines on the 
Use of Assisted Reproductive Technology in Clinical  Practice  and  
Research  (NHMRC  ART)  provide  guidance  on the  circumstances  in  
 which  it  would  be  appropriate  to  use  PGD.64 A number of the 
States have specific legislation governing assisted reproductive technology 
services. While these regulatory instruments do set up systems for the 
governance of the provision of PGD in those States, the NHMRC ART 
nevertheless applies to all States and Territories, because compliance 
with the guidelines is necessary for an IVF clinic to obtain 
accreditation. All IVF providers are required by the Reproductive 
Technology Accreditation Committee (RTAC) to comply with the 
guidelines.65 The NHMRC ART guidelines set down specific 
recommendations in regards to the provision of PGD. Clause 12.1 of the 
guidelines reads: 
PGD is currently used to detect serious genetic conditions, to 
improve ART outcomes and, in rare circumstances, to select an 
embryo with compatible tissue for a sibling. These uses have 
profound ethical significance including: 
• what counts as a serious genetic condition is controversial; 
• there are different perceptions of disability; 
• the practice of selecting against some forms of abnormality 
may threaten the status and equality of opportunity of 
people who have that form of abnormality; 
• the procedures involve the disposal of some healthy embryos; 
and 
• the procedures have technical limitations (such as the failure 
 to identify the genetic abnormality of interest) 
Clinics must ensure careful evaluation of these and all other 
relevant issues before the use of PGD.66 
These guidelines complicate the idea of disability and the significance of its 
consequences. Moreover, they demonstrate how difficult it is to rely upon 
the therapy/enhancement distinction to sort out what should and should 
not be prohibited. The resort to the language of abnormality presupposes 
a highly contestable shared assumption about what is in fact normal. 
Clause 12.2 of the guidelines recommends against allowing selection 
for prevention of conditions that do not seriously harm the person to be 
born; selection of the sex of an embryo except to reduce the risk of 
transmission of a serious genetic condition; or selection in favour of a 
genetic defect or disability in the person to be born. Clause 12.2 clearly 
relies on a shared understanding of disability that has been discounted 
in clause 
12.1. Moreover, the application of a therapy/enhancement distinction is 
instantiated despite the category of disability itself having been 
critiqued in the previous clause. 
ART Clinics too produce ethical guidelines. These documents provide 
a resource for understanding what counts as a disability in the clinical 
context. For instance, Sydney IVF’s guidelines67 clearly state that 
selection against traits not associated with disease and selection for 
disease or disability traits is regarded as inappropriate. While there is 
 no specific statement regarding what might be a disability or disease 
trait, we get a clue from the statement below: 
While there are genetically based traits that could be perceived as 
advantageous or disadvantageous, such advantage or disadvantage 
is likely to be circumstantial and unpredictable. Were it possible to 
use IVF with PGD to produce a child free of a familial trait that is 
not obviously associated with disease or disability, it would be 
unwise to do so to avoid an outcome that, with a level of parental 
respect and love that any child should be able to expect to receive, 
would not be a clinically important concern to the child.68 
Sydney IVF makes the standard a disease or disability of ‘clinical’, rather 
than social, importance. In these circumstances clinical can be 
understood to refer to those diseases or disabilities that would require 
treatment in the clinic. Since all of us require treatment in the 
clinic at some point, it is clear that what is being referred to here must 
be something more significant that minor ailments or indeed minor 
disabilities. Victoria, South Australia and Western Australia, each has 
a different set of criteria to determine when a disability is significant 
enough to allow it to be avoided via PGD. In all these States, the 
regulatory regime is vague and the best way to determine what is a 
disability significant enough to allow PGD is to work in reverse by 
looking at the conditions for which  testing  has  been  approved.69   
These  range  from  single-gene disorders  (e.g.  cystic  fibrosis)  or  
 chromosomal  disorders70    such  as Trisomy 18, to ‘Autosomal recessive 
conditions where it is proposed to identify and select against carrier 
embryos in addition to testing for the condition’.71 The inclusion of 
carrier embryos is particularly significant because it further tests and 
questions the usefulness of the therapy/ enhancement distinction. Is it 
therapy to improve your child’s future reproductive potential by ensuring 
that they will not have  to  face  an adverse reproductive decision when 
they decide to have children because they carry the gene for a disease or 
disability that may be passed on? 
Selection in favour of a disability is prohibited whether by virtue of 
the policies of the State-specific regulatory  bodies  or  by  compliance 
with the NHMRC ART Guidelines.72 In Victoria,  the  Infertility  Treatment 
Authority (ITA) has issued a policy on the use of PGD  that includes a 
prohibition on the use of PGD for selection in favour of a disability. 
While Victorian legislation does not prohibit such a practice, the ITA 
considers ‘selection in favour of genetic disease or abnormality’ 
‘inconsistent’ with the first guiding principle of the Act73 (that ‘the 
welfare and interests of any person. . .to be born. . .are paramount’).74 
Furthermore,  the  compliance  with  the  NHMRC  ART  Guidelines 
forms one of the licence conditions for ART centres,75 thereby excluding 
selection in favour of disability. In Western Australia, neither the 
legislation nor the Reproductive Technology Council’s policy on PGD 
explicitly contemplates the use of PGD for selection in favour of a 
disability. Nonetheless, a condition of every Western Australian licence 
 is accreditation with the RTAC, which, in turn, requires compliance with 
the NHMRC  ART  Guidelines. 
In the UK, PGD is regulated pursuant to the issuing of a license by the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA). While the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (HFE Act) (unamended) 
does not explicitly address the issue of PGD, under its current Code 
of Practice,76 the HFEA does provide guidance for the use of PGD and 
states: 
The use of PGD should be considered only where there is a 
significant risk of a serious genetic condition being present in the 
embryo. The perception of the level of risk by those seeking 
treatment is an important factor in the decision making process. 
The seriousness of the condition should be a matter for discussion 
between the people seeking treatment and the clinical team 
(emphasis added).77 
Section G12.3.3 of the Code of Practice lists the factors that should be 
considered in making the decision to screen for a particular disability: 
(a) the view of the people seeking treatment of the condition to be 
avoided; 
(b) their previous reproductive experience; 
(c) the likely degree of suffering associated with the condition; and 
(d) the availability of effective therapy, now and in the future; and 
(e) the speed of degeneration in progressive disorders; and 
 (f) the extent of any intellectual impairment; and 
(g) the extent of social support available; and 
(h) the family circumstances of the people seeking treatment.78 
In this way the HFEA appears to encourage contextualisation, which 
raises again the argument that disability and co-extensively 
enhancement are fluid and unsustainable as meaningful criteria for 
determining the regulatory limits of the use of PGD.79 
At the time of writing, a Bill has been presented to the UK Parliament, 
the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill 2007. Under this 
amending Bill, a new provision specifically dealing with genetic 
testing of embryos is to be inserted into Schedule 2 of the Act, 
paragraph 1ZA, which prohibits the testing of an embryo except in 
specified circumstances. Those cases are: where there is a particular 
risk that  the embryo may have any gene, chromosome or 
mitochondrion abnormality, establishing whether it has that 
abnormality or any other gene, chromosome or mitochondrion 
abnormality; where the authority is satisfied that in ‘relation to the 
abnormality of which there is a particular risk’, and ‘any other 
abnormality for which testing is to be authorised under sub-paragraph 
(1)(b) that there is a significant risk  that  a person with the 
abnormality will have or develop a serious physical or mental 
disability, a serious illness or  any other serious medical condition’. 
The current policy of the HFEA therefore appears to be preserved 
 under the proposed amendments of the Bill—to test using PGD,  
there  must  be  a  significant  risk of  a  serious  physical/mental 
disability/illness/medical  condition. 
In addition, the proposed HFE amendments contain an explicit 
prohibition on the use of PGD to select in favour of a disability. 
Clause 14 of the HFE Bill proposes a new subsection 13(9), which 
prohibits ‘preferring’ those ‘embryos. . . known to have a gene, 
chromosome or mitochondrion abnormality’ above those ‘not 
known to have such an abnormality’.80 As the Explanatory Notes 
emphasise, this new licence condition prevents ‘similar situations to 
cases, outside the UK, where positive selection of deaf donors in 
order deliberately to result in a deaf child have been reported’.81 
The legislative attempts to regulate the uses of PGD in Australia and 
the UK rely (in part) upon a concept of serious condition or disability as 
the condition precedent for authorising the use of genetic testing of the 
embryo. Implicit in this standard is a concern about curtailing the use of 
PGD to design or tailor the characteristics of one’s progeny, indeed to 
use PGD to screen for certain desired  and  desirable  characteristics  or 
traits. By confining the use of PGD to testing for serious conditions or 
disabilities, its status as a therapeutic technique is sought  to  be  preserved. 
In this way, an ethical distinction between therapeutic and 
nontherapeutic selection (enhancement) has been written into  the  law  by 
using ‘serious disability’ as the benchmark.  However,  the  legislated 
use of the language of ‘abnormality’ in the UK and Australian legislation 
 clearly suggests a stable and knowable norm against which these 
determinations can be made. As we have argued though, the  concept  of 
normal embodiment is unsustainable as both a material fact and 
normative goal. The prohibition of favouring an affected embryo, while not 
legislating directly with respect to enhancement, clearly posits a 
normative standard below which (rather than above which) it is not 
possible to ‘design’. We conclude therefore by challenging the 
appropriateness of imposing a system of regulatory constraints such as  
those  described above on these technologies which enable or constrain 
alteration  by means of selection given their reliance on assumptions 
about the meaning of disability, abnormality and normalcy and the co-
related reliance on an unsustainable distinction between  therapy and  
enhancement to offer ethical, medical and regulatory limits. 
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